22 października 2010

China Accord?

W poprzednim wpisie opisałem marsz Chin ku konsumpcji. Główne założenia to nie być drugą Japonią (Plaza Accord). Dzisiaj w tych duchu pojawił się artykuł w Bloombergu, którego ciekawsze fragmenty wklejam poniżej. China Fear of Echoing Post-Plaza Japan Limits `Hyundai Accord'
China’s reluctance to deliver “shock therapy” through a faster appreciation of the yuan may be a bid to avoid repeating history: Japan’s. As Group of 20 finance chiefs begin talks today in Gyeongju, South Korea, China is deflecting foreign pressure to fast-track the yuan’s gains after limiting them to about 2 percent against the dollar since a June vow to embrace more flexibility. Chinese officials link their resistance against an even quicker rise to fears it would hurt their economy the same way Japan’s sank after 1985’s Plaza Accord shot the yen higher. As Ministry of Commerce spokesman Yao Jian said Oct. 15, that “rapid currency appreciation led exports to plunge, unemployment and economic slowdown” and easier interest rates which caused asset bubbles. “There are uncomfortable similarities” between 1980s Japan and modern China, said Ronald McKinnon, who teaches economics at Stanford University in California and whose 1997 book “Dollar and Yen” was published in China at the urging of former People’s Bank of China official Li Ruogu. “Chinese officials have read about Japan so they know what happened.” [...] New Accord The friction is prompting calls for a new version of the Plaza Accord, an agreement signed by the Group of Five to weaken the dollar. Charles Dallara, who helped write the agreement and is now managing director of the Washington-based Institute of International Finance, told Bloomberg Television on Oct. 14 that officials must “move past this bickering, unilateralism, bilateralism and finger pointing which has unfortunately characterized much of the last few weeks and try to find some common ground on currencies.” Douglas Borthwick, head of foreign-exchange trading at Stamford, Connecticut-based Faros Trading, says there’s about a 50 percent chance of an agreement in which China sets a timeframe to revalue the yuan by a specific amount. “China’s the one in the driving seat here so it’s the one that decides,” said Borthwick, who suggests any framework be called the “Hyundai Accord” after the Gyeongju hotel the media will gather in this week. Faros executes currency transactions on behalf of hedge funds and institutional clients. Japan’s Bubble Japan’s experience nevertheless suggests history may not be repeated this weekend. In Japan, those who believe the yen’s rise following Plaza Accord lies behind Japan’s two decades of weak growth subscribe to the view of “endaka fukyo” or “high yen recession.” Following the Sept. 22 1985 deal, the yen strengthened from about 240 per dollar to about 140 by the end of the decade and then to near 83 by 1995. As the currency rose, Japanese authorities tried to protect the economy by easing monetary and fiscal policies, with the Bank of Japan’s discount rate halving to 2.5 percent by 1987. Such stimulus helped drive the Nikkei 225 to almost 40,000 from 12,500, while property prices soared. When the Bank of Japan started tightening monetary policy in 1989 the bubbles burst, plunging the economy into two decades of rippling recessions and deflation. “It’s clear the yen’s appreciation dampened the nation’s power and potential growth,” said Susumu Kato, chief economist for Japan at Credit Agricole CIB and CLSA in Tokyo. “The stronger yen prompted Japanese companies to shift their production overseas, limiting chances for investment and employment at home.” Not all agree, arguing Japan was also hobbled by failure to rebalance the economy toward domestic consumption sooner, a delay in raising interest rates until bubbles had formed, and waiting too long to tackle banks with non-performing loans. ‘Shock Therapy” Japanese “financial companies were coping with a lot of difficulties” other than the yen, Toshihiko Fukui, the Bank of Japan’s former governor, said in an Oct. 11 interview. The debate now is whether China would repeat Japan’s history if it let the yuan surge. Chinese central bank governor Zhou Xiaochuan signaled such concern Oct. 8 when he said his nation must avoid the “shock therapy” of excessive yuan appreciation and that “very fast” gains probably wouldn’t end global economic imbalances. Yuan gains of 20 percent to 40 percent would exacerbate Chinese unemployment and cause social upheaval, according to Premier Wen Jiabao. “If we recall Japan’s economic policies in the 1980s, many scholars and economists said that led to economic disorder and it’s a lesson to take,” Ministry of Commerce spokesman Yao said. Trade Surplus Japan’s experience suggests a stronger yuan wouldn’t necessarily mean a lower trade surplus because investment in China could decline if the country is viewed as more expensive, said Stanford’s McKinnon. Financial companies would also struggle to adapt to having to buy and hold more dollars, he said. Linking China to Japan of the late 1980s is a false analogy, says Michael Pettis, a finance professor at Peking University. He notes the “real lesson from Japan for China” is to strengthen domestic demand sooner and that once the currency does rise not to resort to lower interest rates to spur investment. Failure to heed that raises, not lessens, the chances of a “lost decade” for China, says Pettis, who was formerly a managing director of Bear Stearns Cos. There are other reasons not to expect another currency accord that’s backed with money, not least that governments now wield less power in a market worth $4 trillion a day compared with $1.7 trillion in 1998. Louvre Accord Such deals can also run out of control. The 1987 Louvre Accord was required to reverse the dollar’s drop and U.S. officials are unlikely to want a similar run on their currency in case it spooks buyers of Treasuries. An alternative may be for nations to begin setting targets for their current-account balances as the U.S. proposes. Bank of Canada Governor Mark Carney said Oct. 20 that the G-20 wants mechanisms and timelines for greater currency flexibility. China may still be moving in the direction of a rising yuan, having allowed it to gain the most since 2005 in September and rise by about 25 percent in five years. Since 1999, the yuan’s performance has been the fourth best among 25 emerging markets tracked by Bloomberg and the median forecast of 17 analysts surveyed by Bloomberg News is for it to climb to 6.32 per dollar by the end of 2011. If they are unable to get China to agree to strengthen the yuan aggressively, fellow G-20 countries might continue to take action with their own currencies and implement capital controls to try to compete until leaders meet next month. “A new Plaza Accord of coordinated intervention seems unlikely,” said Mohi-uddin. “That means unilateral actions will continue and foreign exchange volatility will rise.”

11 komentarzy:

  1. China Blue Book Admits its Economic Growth Rests on Real Estate

  2. Obama Sharpens Yuan Criticism After G-20 Nations Let China Off the Hook
    President Barack Obama attacked China’s policy of undervaluing its currency minutes after he and other Group of 20 leaders ended a summit that failed to agree on a remedy for trade and investment distortions.

    “It is undervalued,” Obama said of the yuan, speaking to reporters in Seoul after the meeting concluded. “And China spends enormous amounts of money intervening in the market to keep it undervalued.”

  3. China Assails Monetary Easing, Citing `Imported Inflation,' Bubble Risks
    China renewed an attack on quantitative easing, citing the risk of increased prices in emerging economies, a day after the Group of 20 nations said the markets can adopt regulatory steps to cope.

    China “doesn’t support” the monetary easing that causes “imported” inflation in developing countries, Commerce Minister Chen Deming told a forum today in Macau, a Chinese special autonomous region. The capital inflows increase the risk of “asset bubbles,” Jin Zhongxia, deputy director general of the international department at the People’s Bank of China, said at the same forum.
    [...]Capital flows into emerging markets are running at $575 billion a year, 20 percent higher than before the world financial crisis, Goldman Sachs Group Inc. said in September. The U.S. dollar has weakened over the past three months against all 16 major market currencies tracked by Bloomberg.

  4. China's 4 Largest Banks to Halt Developer Loans Until Year-End, Paper Says
    China’s four biggest state banks will not issue any new loans to property developers for the remainder of the year, the state-run China Real Estate Business reported, citing unidentified executives at the banks.

  5. http://biznes.onet.pl/zmierzch-chinskiego-imperium-tekstylnego,18572,3785204,1,news-detal

  6. High cotton price hits China's clothing industry

  7. China reported a larger-than-expected 4.4% y-o-y jump in consumer prices. Also this week, China reported its October money supply (up 19.3% y-o-y) and bank loan growth ($89bn) surprised on the upside. Reports on China’s retail sales (up 18.6% y-o-y) and auto sales (up 27% y-o-y) were strong. And to the chagrin of Chinese authorities, real estate prices remain resilient at elevated levels. These days, China’s policymakers face an overheated Bubble Economy, a dilemma compounded by the prospects for surging commodity costs and destabilizing “hot money” inflows. Patience is wearing thin. Prospects are not favorable for monetary “tinkering” to be effective.

  8. Wypowiedź SevenSeas z PiG
    "Wg mnie Chińczycy będą przelewać dolary na euro,bo ich benek wykańcza. "

    Sprzedawanie dolara skutkuje:
    - aprecjacja juana
    - spadkiem importu z usa
    - i jeszcze jedno: 865+ 230+ 458+ 100 = 1653 rezerwy usd ok. 65%, tyle MUSZA trzymac. To moze spasc do 55-60% to wszystko. Swoja droga na ile oceniacie ich rezerwy w € ?

    "Co do reszty to marsz chin trwa. W ostatniego pplanu 5 letniego mają się w 2015
    roku stać krajem który najwiecej konsumuje. W tym celu podnosza juz stopy, zwi
    ekszaja socjal, oraz umacniaja yuana, stopniowo"

    Chiny podnosza stopy BO MUSZA. Podnosza tez wymogi rezerw w bankach, znow poszlo 50bps. Oni maja OGROMNA inflacje (oficjalnie 4.4% w pazdzierniku z 3,3% wrzes, co jest oczywiscie zartem, trzeba bylo przeczytac co napisal credit suisse o tym jak licza inflacje) , ktorej juz nie zatrzymaja. Mam przypomniec ile wzrosly M1 i M2? Wysycenie kredytowe na ich rynku to jest bomba z opuznionym zaplonem. Ich konsumpcja? Aby Chinczyk wiecej konsumowal to:

    a)stopy do gory
    b)rewaluacja juana
    c)wzrost zarobkow

    a) oznacza wiecej bankructw na rynku i klopoty:
    - developerow
    - exporterow
    - lokalnych samorzodow (local government)
    - BANKOW przede wszystkim i SOE, bo to pod te aktywa byly udzielane pozyczki
    - kolopty PBoCh i dewaluacja ich rezerw £,$,€, jena, aud, cad i innych

    b) oznacza klopoty eksporterow bo:
    - to wzrost kosztow wzgledem ich dochodow
    - jesli bedzie przeprowadzona (rewaluacja) wolno to moze im sie uda wzmocnic konspumpcje( wiesz juz dlaczego NIE BEDA WYRZUCAC $, a jak beda to ja bede spiewal "to juz jest koniec" wink
    - jesli rewaluacja postapi za szybko to wzrost kosztow oznacza bankructwa eksporterow/ucieczka za granice = wzrost bezrobocia/spadek zarobkow i spadek konsumpcji

    c) dasz wiecej chinczykowi za jego prace przy spadajacym profit margin via. inflacja/wzrost cen, sprawdz sobie PPI w Chinach, oficjalnie kolo 7-8%. Inflacja jest maskowana wzrostem produktywnosci, narazie.

    "Chińczycy MUSZĄ kupować te obligacje"

    Tak ale nie dlatego, bo tylko dywesyfikuja. Oni kupuja bo:
    - nie chca aby w USA powiekszal sie deficyt handlowy, nie chca konfliktu handlowego (taryfy, one sa nadal aktualne pomimo tego ze wygrali republikanie)
    - chca przerzucic to na EU i aby to mialo efekt to EU MUSI(kraje z deficytem handlowym) miec naplyw kapitalu , i po to (i nie tylko) chiny ich sponsoruja. Czemu net capital inflow? Bo jak nie to:
    - currency account deficit MUSI sie skurczyc. Jesli EU trade deficit sie skurczy to: Surplus niemcow albo innych Eu krajow sie skurczy, albo surplus calej EU sie powiekszy o ta sama liczbe. ALE: slabe euro, kurczacy sie kredyt, zaciesnianie pasa, Niemiecka polityka: eksport nie konsumpcja i rosnace bezrobocie przerzuci wszystko na USA lub Chiny. Slaby juan zalatwi sprawe i koszt tego poniosa stany. Wiec to oznacza TARYFY. CZY TO TAKIE TRUDNE ABY TO ZROZUMIEC?

    Teraz juz jest jasne dlaczego:
    - mamy QE2
    - chinskie zakupy EU bondow
    - banki niemieckie, francuskie i angielskie WYWALAJACE obligacje innych krajow EU? Yieldy do gory, chinczyki sie ciesza, Euro sie troche oslabia przez nadchodzace klopoty.

    To jest juz jasne jak slonce i jasniej nie potrafie. Oni pisza ze jest milo i fajnie, ze sie dogaduja na G20 podczas w eterze mamy napierd*****e na calego i to sie skonczy jak republiknie dojda do wladzy(via. stopy procentowe) albo przez Obame i taryfy. Jest jeszcze inna mozliwosc, sami sie chinczyki przewroca przez inflacje/upadek eskportu . A wtedy wszyscy zrobia oczy bo RMB nie tylko sie nie umocni, ale spadnie na pysk. Ale to bedzie zalezalo od republikanow i ich polityki:

    - ciecia deficytu, co zdlawi konsumpcje i w co (ciecia) osobiscie nie wierze.
    - dalsza polityka QE, dopuki ich nie zadrukuja na smierc, w koncu to stany maja deflacjesmile
    - oba kombinowane, da sie zrobic cos na ksztalt QE bez powiekszania deficytu.

    Uff.. [/quote]

  9. Troch danych o inflacji, kredytach i IP:
    "October CPI surprised markets to the upside by a material margin of 0.4% margin, printing 4.4% y-o-y. Consumer price
    inflation hit a 25-month high. Sequentially, we estimate CPI rose 0.7% m-o-m seasonally adjusted, the fastest pace this year.
    The main driver remains food prices, which accelerated to 10.1% y-o-y in October from 8% y-o-y previously, or contributing
    to 74% of CPI increase. Among others, vegetable prices surged 31% y-o-y. Non-food prices also edged up to 1.6% y-o-y from
    1.4% previously, led mainly by residence related items (rental, utilities and decoration materials, up by 4.9% y-o-y from 4.3%
    PPI also came in higher than consensus (4.5%) at 5% y-o-y in October, up from 4.3% y-o-y in September. Its sequential
    growth quickened to 0.7% m-o-m. In the breakdown, prices of producer goods accelerated to 5.8% y-o-y in October from 4.9%
    previously. Those of consumer goods were relatively better behaved at 2.6% y-o-y in October, compared with 2.5% y-o-y in
    September. The sharp rebound in PPI can be traced back to the recent rally in international commodities prices and price spikes
    of certain products hit by the government's intensified energy efficiency policy measures.
    New lending joined the upside surprise band wagon, recording RMB587.7bn of new loans in October, close to the also
    stronger-than-expected September print of RMB595.5bn. As a result outstanding loan growth picked up to 19.3% y-o-y from
    18.6% y-o-y previously. The breakdown suggests that household loans fell to RMB165bn, led by a significant slowdown
    in mortgage-dominated mid and long term loans (RMB118.9bn). Corporate lending picked up noticeably to RMB422.2bn
    (vs. RMB337previously), as the impact of the roll-off in discounted bills eased significantly to RMB100mn in October from
    RMB90bn previously. Short term loans and mid and long term loans stabilized at strong levels, with the former rising to
    RMB147.1bn and the later moderating to RMB240.7bn.
    Broad money supply growth picked up to 19.3% y-o-y from 19% previously, drifting a bit further away from the 17% year-end
    target. M1 growth also accelerated to 22.1% y-o-y from 20.9% previously, reflecting China's still ample liquidity conditions.
    Industrial production growth fell slightly below market expectations, slowing to 13.1% y-o-y in October from 13.3% y-o-y in
    September. Seasonally adjusted, we estimate that IP's sequential growth stood at around 1%, similar to September's. Heavy
    industries growth was hit again by the government's energy efficiency measures, decelerating to the year-low at 13.2% in
    October from 13.4% in September. Power generation growth also fell to 5.9% y-o-y from 8.1% previously. The discrepancy
    between the power production and still rapid IP growth is likely due to unofficial power generation to meet the demand for
    factory productions."

  10. Przy okazji, wprowadziłem nowy system komentarzy, by łatwiej móc komentować odpowiedzi, obecny standard w blogosferze. System wymaga zalogowania do jednego z 4 systemów. Proponuje Disqui, wspólny dla wielu blogów, for i stron internetowych.


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