Banki inwestycyjne nie po raz pierwszy rysują scenariusze, w których dolar nie jest już walutą dominującą na rynkach finansowych. Tak jest i tym razem w przypadku analityków z RBS. Wielu uważa, że jedynie blogerzy, niezależne media i internaucie mogą rysować takie scenariusze. Takie osoby są w błędzie gdyż regularnie raporty o utracie dominacji dolara są przygotowywane przez czołowe instytucje finansowe takie jak Citibank, UBS, Morgan Stanley, Nomura czy Goldman Sachs. Nie bez powodu trzon banków europejskich od dawna rekomenduje złoto, a np. HSBC jest "fanem" RMB (CHRL). Wpis z serii "Mythbusters". The USD hangover: EM Central Banks get hooked on local currency bonds "The dollar is our currency but your problem”
Following the US sovereign downgrade and a commitment to an exceptionally loose monetary policy, this problem has become an even bigger headache for emerging market (EM) central banks with large holdings of USD assets. The Bretton Woods 2 system is clearly no longer a mutually beneficial relationship. We discuss these issues and the diversification choices available to EM policymakers. Our main conclusions are:Wybrane wykresy z raportu: 1. Obecna dominacja dolara na rynkach finansowych 2. Trendy w akumulowaniu rezerw banków centralnych gospodarek wschodzących 3. Względny udział w obligacjach Papier RBS:
The Bretton Woods 2 system is an informal international monetary system that has existed over the last decade or so. The broad contours of the system are as follows: By running a large current account deficit, the US economy is a source of export growth/employment for emerging markets (EM). The deficit itself, is funded by systematic intervention in the foreign exchange markets by EM central banks, which also provides the external financing required by the US to fund the deficits. Accumulating large amounts of FX reserves and in the form of dollar assets such as treasuries was also viewed favourably by EM central banks and particularly Asian central banks in the aftermath of the 1997/98 financial crisis. In fact, it was a regarded as a form of ‘self insurance’ against future speculative attacks. The durability of this system is being challenged and the system no longer represents the old symbiosis of interests. As should be inevitable with the level and duration of de-leveraging needed, the growth potential of the US has deteriorated and the current account gap is being structurally downsized. This adjustment will have a lasting impact on EM exports, regardless of the monetary arrangements. And indeed, trade data suggests that the role of the US as the marginal driver of EM exports is diminishing.
- It is wrong to assume that a reserve currency can remain one regardless of the underlying macro policies. The diminution of the GBP in the early to mid-1900s is a case in point.
- In the current context, portfolio risks of staying in US treasuries have increased. Neither can the US remain a dominant driver of EM exports.
- Reducing the pace of reserve accumulation would be the most practical solution to this problem. Additionally, there is scope for increasing allocations in alternate currencies, CHF and EM local currency bond markets.
- Local currency bond markets are small but rapidly growing.