14 grudnia 2011

Chiny - renminbi - CNH\CNY - problem

Z braku czasu wrzucam bardziej zajawkowo - wygląda na to, iż Chińczycy zaczynają mieć problem z odpływem pieniędzy, a zatem z OSŁABIENIEM ich waluty.
Wybrane arty do czytania, i zajawka z raportu Standard Chartered:
"This price action suggests that the market is not selling US dollars (USD) as it once did and that the People‟s Bank of China (PBoC) could be selling USD from its FX revenues"
Ciekawy wpis:
China saw its first recent decline in October in funds outstanding for foreign exchange, according to data released by the country’s central bank on Nov. 21. The funds dropped by 24.89 billion yuan (US$3.91 billion) from September: the country’s first decline since December 2007.
The latest weekly report from China International Capital Corporation Limited estimated that capital outflow from China had reached 180 billion yuan (US$28.29 billion) in October.
Investment had been keeping the capital flow into China in a positive direction, but the hopes investors have for the Chinese economy have cooled.
The three big credit rating agencies in the United States, Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s and Fitch Rating, maintained a pessimistic viewpoint regarding China’s economy in July and August, predicting that the bad debts of Chinese banks will reach 8 to 12 percent in 2012 and 2013, with an estimated 60 percent chance of a financial crisis occurring in 2013.
Tao Ma is an Economics Ph.D. at the People’s University of China. He estimates that about US$300 billion of “hot” money has flowed into China over the past 10 years. He explained that in the process of waiting for the yuan exchange rate to increase, this money was poured into the real estate market, stock market, underground private banks, and other speculative investments. However, as China’s economy cooled down, the money began to flow in the opposite direction.
Officials Transferring Money
A report entitled “Salary and family wealth of employees of Party organs and government institutions” was jointly released by the State Council, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in April of 2010, stating that the wealth of 1.31 million officials (those who rank above the county administration level) and their families accounted for 80 percent of China’s wealth.
The Chinese language website Boxun, quoted the State Council report as saying that from 1996 to 2003, about 2.2 trillion yuan (US$345.78 billion) of outflow money from China was filtered into the offshore bank accounts of Chinese officials and their families.
Larry Lang is an economist and chair professor of Finance at the Chinese University in Hong Kong. In an article for Business Sohu he said that based on his own research, the outflow money from China had already reached more than three trillion yuan (US$471.51 billion) in 2003.
Shi Zangshan, a Washington D.C.-based China expert, told The Epoch Times that it’s nothing new that wealthy Chinese are moving abroad. In the past, Chinese officials and businessmen used to transfer their money to foreign countries, sending it back to China as foreign investment, in order to take profit from preferential policy.
“But nowadays, it’s possible that wealthy Chinese are not planning on going back to China at all. They are leaving China for real: they transfer their money abroad before they leave China.”
Shi compared China’s economic situation to what some economists refer to as the Latin American model: Latin America underwent rapid development in the 1950s and the 1960s, resulting in a huge disparity between the rich and the poor, serious corruption, and an absence of the rule of law.
Scores of wealthy individuals subsequently immigrated to North America, bringing their considerable capital assets with them, which ultimately resulted in shutting down the economies of Latin American countries from the 1970s to the 1990s.
He concluded, “China is obviously going down the same path.”
A New Epoch Weekly article cited Brazil as a corollary: From 1968 to 1974, the military government implemented a policy of high tax and “compulsory industrialization.” As a result, the country’s GDP increased 11.4 percent, which continued for six years, creating the “Brazil Miracle.”
However, the policy aggravated the gap between the rich and the poor and eventually led to retaliation by peasants and social turmoil. After foreign investment sources withdrew, the country was left with outdated, shabby factories and staggering numbers of unemployed.
Shi likened the economic development of a country to the starting of the engine of a car. Capital needs to go through an accumulation process, and continuous growth is dictated by the accumulation of both capital and talents. Once capital and talents leave the country, it will be thrown into a severe financial crisis: the engine will thus need to be restarted later.
He reasoned that if the current trend in China continues, it will have a huge impact on China’s economy. The dictatorial nature of the regime could lead it to chose the easy way out by opting for strict and direct control, but such an approach could lead to creating a greater issue for wealthy Chinese, resulting in accelerating the outflow of capital from China.
Za Epoch Times, ukłony Kecaj84
Raport Standard Chartered - klik

9 komentarzy:

  1. W Chinach pęka bańka na rynku nieruchomości. Co z tego wyniknie?
    W listopadzie w Pekinie ceny mieszkań spadły o 35 proc. w porównaniu z poprzednim miesiącem. - Rynek nieruchomości w Chinach znalazł się w punkcie zwrotnym, a banki są zaniepokojone, że wkrótce wystąpi reakcja łańcuchowa na tym rynku - ostrzegał na początku grudnia chiński bank centralny. - Załamanie się rynku nieruchomości w Chinach jest nieuchronne, ale nie spodziewam się, żeby jego konsekwencje były tak poważne jak np. w USA - powiedział Piotr Kuczyński, analityk Xelionu
    - Inwestycje na rynku nieruchomości wyhamowały, deweloperzy przestali finansować nowe projekty, a liczba transakcji na rynku oraz ceny spadły. Spowolnił również wzrost kredytów na zakup nieruchomości, co oznacza, że rynek znalazł się w punkcie zwrotnym - ocenił chiński bank centralny. W październiku zanotowano pierwszy spadek cen nieruchomości w Chinach w tym roku w porównaniu z poprzednim miesiącem. Z kolei badania przeprowadzone przez pozarządowe instytucje wskazują, że listopad może być trzecim z rzędu miesiącem spadków cen na tym rynku.

    Jak pisze w Business Insider Patrick Chovanec, profesor na Tsinghua University School of Economics and Management w Pekinie, pierwsze oznaki kryzysu pojawiły się już w połowie roku. W sierpniu dziesięciu wiodących chińskich deweloperów podało, że posiada niesprzedane mieszkania o łącznej wartości 318 miliardów juanów (50 miliardów dolarów). Aż 46 proc. z nich było wybudowanych jeszcze w poprzednim roku. Ze względu na wysoki stosunek zadłużenia do aktywów spółki były zmuszone do zamiany tych zapasów na gotówkę. Wyprzedaż rozpoczęła się w październiku. Kilku deweloperów z Szanghaju zaczęło obniżać ceny nowych mieszkań o 25 proc. lub więcej. Zniżki wywołały protesty ze strony inwestorów, którzy wcześniej kupili takie same mieszkania po wyższej cenie. Kupujący domagali się refundacji. W listopadzie już w co najmniej dziesięciu miastach deweloperzy obniżali ceny oferowanych mieszkań, m.in. w Szanghaju, Shenzhen, Nanjing, Suzhou, Hangzhou, Changshan i Changchun. W Pekinie o 22 proc. zmalała liczba transakcji kupna mieszkań w stosunku do ubiegłego roku, a ceny mieszkań spadły finalnie o 35 proc. miesiąc do miesiąca.

    Według Piotra Kuczyńskiego bańka spekulacyjna jest podobna do tej, z którą mieliśmy do czynienia na rynku nieruchomości w USA czy w Hiszpanii. - Załamanie się rynku nieruchomości w Chinach jest nieuchronne, ale nie spodziewam się, żeby jego konsekwencje były tak poważne jak np. w USA. Poza tym PKB Chin w głównej mierze uzależniony jest od eksportu, więc nawet załamanie rynku zostałoby przypuszczalnie zniwelowane przez eksport - powiedział analityk Xelionu.
    http://gospodarka.gazeta.pl/gospodarka/1,33181,10814332,W_Chinach_peka_banka_na_rynku_nieruchomosci__Co_z.html

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  2. Looser do Kuczyńskiego na PiG:
    Panu Kuczynskiemu ekspertowi od chinskiej ekonomii juz podzienkujemy. Analityk Xellion coz za specialista.

    Panie analityku eksport zaczyna kulec wiec moze niczego nie zniwelowac. Zauwazyles pan obnizki stop rezerw? Uwolnili 50 miliardow $, aby podtrzymac te "walace sie ceny nieruchomosci" i zniwelowac wlasnie kulejacy eksport i przez to zwiekszyc inwestycje. Bo inwestycje to pewnie z 60% PKB teraz. A wiedzial pan analityk ze 50% pieniedzy wpakowanych w te nieruchomosci zostalo zebranych POZA Chinami? I 40% z tych pieniedzy dostaly lokalne samorzady za sprzedaz ziemi? Reszte pieniedzy FIRMY DEVELOPERSKIE pozyczyly od bankow, chinskich bankow. Jak zabraknie im kasy i zbankrutuja to te mieszkania czyli ich aktywa zostana zlicytowane i zgadnij panie ekonomisto kto je KUPI/PRZEJMIE, za grosze. A zapowiedzieli ze beda budowac mieszkania socialne. Nie taki glupi ten komunista, nie?

    Sip ceny nieruchomosci od dawna probowano schlodzic i wiedzieli ze tak sie stanie, bedzie ladowanie i teraz bedzie zalezalo od USA jakie. Jesli EU i USA pojda w strone protekcjonizmu i jest na to wielka szansa, to Chiny beda mialy naprawde duzy problem. Tak czy inaczej skonczy sie wielka prywatyzacja aktyw i emisja bondow dla obcokrajowcow. Jaka prywatyzacja? Czy ja juz nie pisalem ze caly dlug jest wewnetrzny?
    --
    " A journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step" - Lao Tzu.
    http://forum.gazeta.pl/forum/w,17007,115613425,131569417,Re_Chiny_czas_odswiezyc_temat_.html

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  3. Looser z PiG:
    Ja to widze troche inaczej. Problemem nie jest "odplyw" kapitalu, tylko coraz mniejszy naplyw. Odplyw kapitalu jest tylko wymyslem pismakow bo z cyferek jeszcze tego nie widac. Problemem jest to ze Yuan teraz bedzie sie oslabial i da powod i EU i USA do wiekszego politycznego ataku. Pojda w strone protekcjonizmu bo nie chca zauwazyc u siebie zadnych bledow i wola pokazywac palcem na innych szczegolnie nijaki Romney. Taryfy beda oznaczac posrednio aprecjacje yuana i kolko sie zamyka, bo naplyw bedzie coraz mniejszy. Co sie stanie w Chinach? Juz pisalem w poscie powyzej, zaczna od beficytu budzetowego i emisji obligacji, beda prywatyzacje wielkich SOE i innych aktyw. Podniosa stopy, przy ZEROWYM DEFICYCIE MOGA. Pieniadze zacznac plynac od kredyciazy do oszczedzajacych. Czy uda im sie pobudzic konsumpcje? W tak krotkim czasie nie sadze. Ale sprawy moim zdaniem beda sie mialy lepiej niz sa, to znaczy beda na dobrej drodze aby sie wygrzebac z czego brzydkiego. Mam wiekszy szacunek do Chin niz mialem kiedys i stracilem caly do impotentow z EU. Wtedy zobaczymy co zrobia amerykanie i jak to jest z tym kryzysem naprawde.

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  4. China's epic hangover begins
    China's credit bubble has finally popped. The property market is swinging wildly from boom to bust, the cautionary exhibit of a BRIC's dream that is at last coming down to earth with a thud.
    http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/china-business/8957289/Chinas-epic-hangover-begins.html

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  5. Chiny otwierają się zagraniczny kapitał:
    China opens door to foreign investors
    China will open more channels for foreign institutions to invest in its stock markets, a move aimed at supporting share prices and helping to counter capital outflows as the economy slows.
    The Chinese securities regulator announced late on Friday that renminbi held offshore could be used to buy equities within China, a long-awaited reform that is critical to promoting more international use of the Chinese currency.
    Local media also reported that the government was preparing to expand significantly the number of quotas that allow foreign institutions to invest in China’s closely guarded markets.
    Foreign funds play a tiny role in China, accounting for just about 1 per cent of total market value, and the new openings are unlikely to change that, at least initially. But together they underline Beijing’s desire to liberalise capital controls gradually and to bring more institutional money into markets that often resemble casinos.
    The reforms come as central bank money data for October showed the first evidence of capital outflows since 2007. Beijing has long been worried about hot money inflows, but companies and investors have moved in the opposite direction over the past two months as concerns have mounted about the country’s weakening property market.
    While the amount of money that has exited China appears to be relatively small, it has placed downward pressure on the renminbi, led to tighter monetary conditions and hurt the stock market. The Shanghai Composite Index slumped 10 per cent over the past month, falling to its lowest level since early 2009.
    Faced with a slowing economy, the Chinese government has cautiously shifted its policy into pro-growth mode. But analysts say that worries about debt levels and inflation will keep it from stimulating the economy as aggressively as it did in 2009. Premier Wen Jiabao has also emphasised that the government will keep property controls in place to rein in sky-high housing prices.
    But the government has been increasingly assertive in trying to prop up stock prices. In October, a state-run investment vehicle bought a small number of shares in a widely trumpeted move.
    Beijing is also looking to bring more domestic institutions into play as investors. Speaking at a forum last week, Guo Shuqing, the country’s chief securities regulator, said he wanted to harness the vast assets of local pension funds to help stabilise the often unruly markets.
    China’s $80bn national pension fund invests about a third of its assets in stocks. Local pension funds are far bigger, with total assets of about $315bn, and they put very little of that into stocks.
    Mr Guo’s proposal has already met opposition. China’s stock markets are notorious for insider trading, and critics said that until they are cleaned up, they would not make a safe home for pension assets.
    “The markets will not just consume the money you want today. They will also consume the money that you are saving for old age,” wrote Liu Shan, deputy editor of the China Business Times.

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  6. 1/2
    Chiny próbują rozkręcić HIBOR:


    Illiquid money, FX swap mkts hinder dim sum loan development-TMA
    * TMA met APLMA to discuss developing benchmark reference rate

    * TMA deems money, FX swap mkts not liquid or deep enough

    * Loan bankers agree but think base rate is needed

    By Jacqueline Poh and Foster Wong

    HONG KONG, Dec 9 (Reuters Basis Point) - The Asia Pacific Loan Market Association (APLMA) announced on its website that it met with the Treasury Markets Association (TMA) to discuss developing a benchmark reference rate for offshore Rmb syndicated loans.

    Although the TMA recognises the demand for fixing a common base rate for Dim Sum loans, the organisation believes that "the money and FX swap markets are not yet liquid and deep enough to provide a credible rate fixing in this new offshore currency".

    In a published response on APLMA's website, TMA said it "needs to ensure we have an indisputable fixing when launched and we are of the view that the market in not in this position yet".

    And "in order to promote transparency and path the way to develop the official reference rates in offshore Rmb, TMA will invite a few banks to post their own offer rates on TMA's website. The development of Hibor fixing on offshore Rmb is one important topic discussed in our Market Practices Committee meeting."

    MARKET PLAYERS' VIEWS

    However, some market players have different views.

    A senior loans banker with a major foreign bank reckoned that TMA's response and the development of Dim Sum loans is a chicken-and-egg situation. "If there is a base rate, at least we know where our costs stand. And if there is no base rate created, how can the market grow in its depth?"

    The banker, though, agreed that a base rate may not be representative of where the market stands, but a base rate is needed as a benchmark to gauge where banks' costs are.

    "No rate can serve the purpose of a benchmark offered rate unless there is interbank market activity for offshore Rmb," a senior corporate banker with a Chinese bank said earlier in a survey on Dim Sum loans conducted by Thomson Reuters Basis Point. "The Rmb liquidity pool is already there, the key is to have sufficient corporate demand plus an active interbank market to facilitate its development."

    But no base rate yet can truly reflect their funding costs in the market today, the surveyed bankers said.

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  7. 2/2
    "There is no rate that can truly reflect banks' funding costs of Rmb in Hong Kong when the offshore Rmb market is still at its infancy," said a local bank's head of syndications.

    As a senior loans banker with a Japanese bank said, "If you look at the huge differences among three different Rmb rates offered by the three banks, you can tell Hong Kong's Rmb interbank market is still far from maturity."

    "So far, only three banks in Hong Kong -- Bank of China Hong Kong, Hang Seng Bank and HSBC -- are quoting Rmb lending rates, and the differences among the three rates ranged from 0.9% to 1.3%.

    "Take the three-month rate as of December 9 for example. BOCHK's is 2.2%, while HSBC's is at 1.3%, and Hang Seng's Rmb prime rate, which does not have a timeline, is at 3%."

    Meanwhile, some bankers suggested a fixed rate, and many bilateral offshore Rmb loans had been structured with a fixed rate.

    "A fixed rate will be a fair base rate for both lenders and borrowers when no benchmark is around," said a banker with a Chinese bank.

    A banker with an international institution agreed, saying banks' choices are, in fact, dependent on the borrowers. "Historically, not all deals were using the Libor or Hibor rate back then, some were done on banks' prime rates," the banker said.

    WHERE LIQUIDITY AND FX SWAP STAND

    Meanwhile, a money market strategist with a European bank in Hong Kong said liquidity for Rmb trade has been drying up in the past few weeks but noted that the FX swap market is still relatively active, especially for short-tenor swaps, with trading volume at some US$5bn a day.

    Rmb deposits in Hong Kong have been growing rapidly, surging fivefold to Rmb315bn as at the end of 2010 from Rmb63bn in 2009, according to Hong Kong Monetary Authority data. The city's Rmb deposits stood at Rmb618.5bn as of October this year.

    The loan market has been yearning for a solely Rmb-denominated syndicated loan since the emergence of Dim Sum bonds, which stand at Rmb142bn so far this year, according to Thomson Reuters data.

    But the loan market has only been seeing small-sized tranches in Rmb being done on a syndicated basis such as a Rmb170m tranche in United Asia Finance Ltd's HK$480m-equivalent three-year loan completed in early November.

    "They (Dim Sum loans) were all tiny tranches of clubs, or sometimes, bilateral -- not even medium-sized and not solely denominated in Rmb," said a senior banker with a local bank.

    Currently, many banks are overwhelmed with Rmb fundraising requests from borrowers, and most were completed as bilateral loans.

    And as more firms surface for Rmb loans, loan bankers note the importance and urgency for a commonly agreed benchmark rate.

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  8. China unveils detailed rules on RQFII -Xinhua
    BEIJING, Jan 5 (Reuters) - China's central bank has unveiled detailed rules on yuan-denominated investment activities in China to pave the way for offshore yuan to flow back to its stock and bond markets, the official Xinhua news agency reported. The new guidelines on the implementation of the Renminbi Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (RQFII) come after China granted a total 10.7 billion yuan ($1.7 billion) investment quota for 10 investment firms in Hong Kong. According to the new guidelines, foreign firms should open RQFII basic deposit accounts for settlement purposes, as well as RQFII special deposit accounts, in a Chinese commercial bank qualified to act as a QFII custodian and settlement agent in the interbank bond market. Foreign firms must create a separate special deposit account for each open-ended fund they launch and cannot open a general deposit or temporary deposit account for permanent institutions otherwise approved by the PBOC. The firms can open three types of special deposit accounts for transactions in the onshore stock and bond markets and funds can be transferred between the accounts. But foreign firms will be barred from making fund transfers between special deposit accounts and basic deposit accounts. Cash withdrawals are prohibited from special deposit accounts. The RQFII scheme, also called mini-QFII, is widely regarded as a gift offered by Beijing to Hong Kong to help support the fledgling market for trading offshore yuan that has been established in the former British colony. China has been promoting the use of the yuan in cross-border trade, building Hong Kong into an offshore yuan center. But foreign holders of yuan can only park the money at banks or buy a limited number of yuan-denominated bonds in Hong Kong as there is a shortage of investment channels for the currency overseas.

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  9. “Raising Children” & “Building a Nursery”
    – Additional Thoughts on the Internationalisation of the RMB
    (Synopsis based on Chinese original)
    http://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/newsconsul/blog/120103blog.htm

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